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Abstract— In this paper we consider an electricity market in
which not only the power producers but also the transmission
owners can submit a bid. The market is cleared at each stage by
minimizing the sum of the production prices and the transmission
prices.
A model of the strategic behavior is formulated for the
different agents of the system. This strategic behavior modelling
leads to a market dynamics that can be used to determine the
different payoffs of the agents over a temporal horizon.
Simulations are carried out for several configurations of this
two node power system. The influence of the transfer capacity
and the market structure on the payoffs of the different agents
is discussed.
Index Terms— Active transmission owner agent, competition
modelling, market dynamics
I. INTRODUCTION
The transmission network is a key element in the electricity
market. It allows producers and consumers to access the
network and inject or withdraw the power contracted in the
market. However, while competition has been introduced be-
tween producers and consumers, the owner of the transmission
grid continues to have only a passive role in the market. The
major reason for this choice was related to the idea of natural
monopoly of the transmission network.
Nevertheless, recent market design proposals have analyzed
the possibility of providing incentives for transmission in-
vestments, and of promoting, through performance settlement
criteria, a more efficient usage of the transmission network
[1]- [2].
Different types of schemes have been proposed based on
the creation of short and long term markets for Financial
Transmission Rights (FTR) [3], or for the regulation of prices
of Independent Transmission Companies [4].
In this paper, we consider the Transmission Owner (TO)
as an agent that can express its willingness to be paid for
transmission service through a bid. We define a new market
mechanism in which the objective function takes into account
both the transmission bids and the power producer offers. To
analyze what the different payoffs of the agents in this market
structure may be, we model their behavior which leads to a
market dynamics. The payoffs over a certain time horizon
are computed by integrating this dynamics over this period
of time.
The mathematical formulation is, for the sake of simplicity,
related to a two node power system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II explains the
market characteristics and the strategy adopted to model the
different agents. Section III details the simulation conditions
while in Sections IV and V, simulation results related to
different power systems are given and discussed. In Section VI
we illustrate the influence of the market type on the different
agents’ rewards by comparing the previously computed results
with the ones that would have been obtained with a traditional
locational price market. And finally Section VII concludes.
II. POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
We consider here a power system composed of two nodes
 
and  . A load is connected at each node, load A and load
B. Each load has a constant inelastic demand of  and  .
The line that connects these two nodes is supposed to be a
loss-less transmission line, which can only transfer a limited
amount of power (  ). Generators are connected at each end
























Fig. 1. A simple power system composed of generators and loads connected
through a single transmission line.
We suppose that the active market participants are the gen-
erators and the TO. Moreover, we suppose that the marginal
cost of each generator is constant and that each of them can

















be the &  ( &  ) generators of the system connected to node












) the maximum amount of power it
can produce. Moreover, let 9;: be the transmission owner of
the line.
We suppose that an Independent System Operator (ISO) is
in charge of clearing the market. Furthermore, we refer to each
session of the market as a stage. In the following the market
clearing mechanism, the payoffs of the different agents and
their bidding strategies are illustrated.
A. The market clearing mechanism














) asks per MW to produce. Furthermore, we suppose
that the 9;: submits a bid
<=?>
that represents the price the
transmission owner asks per MW flowing through the line.
2The clearing mechanism for the market consists of finding
which quantity of power each generator has to produce, and
consequently how many MWs flow into the line, in order to
satisfy the load demand at the minimum expenditure.
This mechanism can be stated as follows :













































































































































, the energy prices at node
 
and



























































































The idea is to establish a price for each node equal to
the maximum between (i) the marginal price of the energy
produced at that node and (ii) the sum of the marginal price
of the energy produced somewhere else and the marginal price
of transmission needed to deliver that energy to the node under
analysis. It is useful to note that these nodal prices represent
for the load a signal of energy and transmission price.
B. The payoffs of the different agents
Once the dispatched quantities are obtained and the prices
for energy at the different nodes are computed, it is possible
to determine the payoffs (or rewards) of the different agents
of the power system. In particular, we assume that the nodal
price is the price paid by loads and received by generators, at
the bus. Whereas the 9 : is paid at a price equal to its bid.
The mathematical formulation of the rewards is described
below :
Power producer agent : The payoff of a power producer agent
is equal to the money it gets for producing the electricity minus










































	`h?iVj 	kkle  qn"rsjut/	 and zero
otherwise.
Transmission Owner agent : The payoff of the 9 : is equal
to the money that it gets for the MWs flowing in its line. The



















Note that since the absolute value of the flow is considered,
the 9;: is paid independently of the direction of the flow.





 are equal to “ minus the money they pay

















It could happen that the total amount of money paid by the
customers is greater than the total amount of money received
by the generators and the transmission owner, that is the












































In such a case, we assume that this quantity is kept by
the ISO or an independent organization (not involved in for-
profit market activities). The total amount of money collected
during the whole period could be set apart to cover some of
the maintenance costs of the system.
C. The bidding strategy of active market participants
The goal of each active market participant is to submit a
bid that will maximize its payoff.
We assume that each active market participant knows the
algorithm used by the ISO to solve the market as well as the
mathematical formulation of the nodal price calculation.
The assumed behavior model for each market participant is
based also on the following assumptions:
 each agent knows the load value (   and   );
 each agent knows the generation or transmission capacity of









































) at time  2. Let  =?> be the set of possible
bids for the transmission owner and
<
= >
 the bid submitted
by the 9;: at time  3.
We suppose that each agent submits the bid that would
maximize its payoff if the other agents keep the same bids as
the ones they submitted at the previous stage. By noticing that
the value of the rewards of the different agents are functions
of the bid submitted, the active agents compute therefore their
bid as follows:
2The possible bids for the generators range between the marginal production
cost and the price cap.
3The possible bids for the transmission owner range between the marginal






























































































































These three equations show that each active market par-
ticipant solves several optimization problems to determine
the expected payoff that could be obtained for each one of
the possible bid strategies when the expected bids of the
competitors are kept unchanged. Eventually, the chosen bid
corresponds to the one that gives rise to the maximum expected
payoff.
Equilibrium











































. Note that when a system
is in an equilibrium point, an active market participant cannot
increase its payoff by being the only one to change its bid
function.
III. SIMULATION CONDITIONS
In the next two sections, we are going to simulate the market
dynamics. We describe below the simulation conditions used.
 The simulations are referred to a temporal horizon of 
periods (number of stages). Therefore, the market dynamics is
going to be integrated over  stages.
 The value of both loads (  ,  ) is assumed constant and
equal to  MW.
 The maximum admissible bid price (Price Cap) is equal to
ﬀ $/MW4.








is built by considering only the bids in the admissible range












# is an integer.
 When Eqns (13), (14) and (15) have multiple solutions (i.e.
several bid prices give the same reward value), we suppose
that the bid price submitted is the least expensive one.
 We suppose that at stage ﬂ3) each agent assumes the
bid of its competitors at the previous stage ( 3
2
 ) to be
























IV. TWO GENERATORS IN THE SYSTEM
A. Description of the system
The system we consider here has one generator connected to








. We suppose that each generator can produce







 ). Furthermore, we assume that
$%,&0'

has a marginal cost of  $/MW ( 2,'

35 ) and $%,&0'

a
marginal cost of 6 $/MW ( 2 '

376 ). We study in the next two
paragraphs the market dynamics for two different values of
the line transfer capacity.
4To be more accurate we should use as a unit of price $/(MW*duration of



















Fig. 2. Input of the market : the bids of 
	8M , 
	:9  and ;=<
MW







































(b) Prices at node A and node B
Fig. 3. Output of the market : production of each generator and nodal prices
B. Market dynamics: Transmission capacity of  MW
This simulation refers to the case where the line transfer
capacity is equal to 50 MW.
Figure 2 illustrates the bid strategy of each active market
participant. The bids are calculated according to Eqns (13),
(14) and (15).
The first offer of 9;: is just slightly below the difference
between the marginal costs of the two generators. However,
due to the generators’ bid strategies, the 9;: bids are equal
to zero in the next stages. Each generator tries to exploit its
market power with its bids at the first stage. However, in the
subsequent stages, the competition between the two power
producers leads to a progressive undercutting of the bids. The
process ends when the expensive generator $%,& '

reaches its
marginal cost. At that stage, an equilibrium point is reached.
The transmission bid ( <
= > ) is equal to zero, the $%,& '

bid
is equal to its marginal costs ( 6 $/MW) and the $%,& '

bid is
slightly below the competitor bid, (namely ( (' D $/MW).
In Figure 3 the quantity produced by each generator and the
nodal prices are shown.
It is interesting to notice that in the first stage, when the
transmission bid is different from zero, both the generators
produce. Whereas, after that, until equilibrium is reached,
the generator that submits the cheaper bid produces the total
amount of power requested by the load.
The nodal prices at the two buses are the same at each stage,
except for the first one when the prices are 9 3E:' D $/MW
and 9  376 $/MW. It should be noted that after the first peak,
the nodal prices decrease and reach their lowest values at the
equilibrium. This value corresponds to (' D $/MW, namely the
bid price of the cheapest generator ( $%& '

).
C. Market dynamics: Transmission capacity of  MW
In the following simulation the line transfer capacity is
chosen to be 25 MW.
In this case the strategy is heavily influenced by the possible
presence of congestion on the line. In Figure 4 the bidding
48
$/MW

















Fig. 4. Input of the market : the bids of 	  , 




































(b) Prices at node A and node B
Fig. 5. Output of the market : production of each generator and nodal prices
strategies of the active players are shown. Figures IV-Ca-b
show the production quantities and the nodal prices, respec-
tively.
Since the capacity of the line is limited, neither generator
can serve both loads. Therefore, both generators know that
they will be dispatched for a minimum quantity of  MW,
because of the limited capacity of the line (  37 MW) and
the inelastic demand of  MW at both buses.
In the following we discuss some features of the participant
strategic behaviors and the market outcomes.
At the first stage, the cheapest generator available in the
system $%&('

offers a price just below the sum of the marginal
cost of the expensive generator $%,&('

and the marginal cost
of 9;: , since it assumes that both the competitors will bid at
marginal cost. At the same time $%,&('

bids at the price cap,
assuming that it will not be dispatched more than  MW,
because its marginal cost is greater of the sum of the marginal
costs of the rivals.The 9;: bids just below the difference of
the marginal costs of the power producers.
At the second stage $%,&('

changes its offer and bids at the
price cap. It believes that by changing its bid to ﬀ $/MW it
will produce less (50 MW) but at a much higher price and
get in the end a higher reward. Generator $%,& '

reduces its
bid to 3.8 $/MW to be less expensive than the bid of $%,& '

at
the first stage plus the bid of
<
= >
in order to be competitive
with $%,&0'

and cover the load at its bus. The 9;: bids a price
slightly below the difference between the competitors at the
previous stage.
The results at this stage show that both generators are dis-
patched for the same quantity, both nodal prices are equal to
the bid energy price at the bus, and no flow is observed in the
line. Basically, the high transmission price prevented greater
production from the generator with the lower bid ( $%& '

).
At the third stage both generators bid at the price cap,
assuming that the 9 : continues to offer a very high transmis-
sion price. However, the 9;: reduces its offer which becomes
Rewards obtained by the different agents

















25 2,172 885 22.5 40 -4,585 -4,710
50 1,980 205 0 0 -3,865 -3,870
TABLE I
INFLUENCE OF LINE TRANSFER CAPACITY ON THE REWARDS.
less than the difference between the competitors’ bids at the
previous stage. The same observations made in the previous
stage about the nodal prices and the dispatched quantities hold.
At the fourth stage, the 9;: bids at zero, because the dif-
ference between the expected competitors’ bids is very small.
Both the generators undercut their prices. Each one offers a bid
price lower that the expected sum of the competitors’ bids.
The generators end up offering the same price, and conse-
quently they are dispatched for the same quantity, and the
nodal prices are equal to their bids.
In the following stages, we can observe a progressive
undercutting, of the generators’ bids until the more expensive
generator reaches the value of 6('
ﬀ $/MW. During all stages
when the undercut strategy is adopted by the generators, the
9;: continues to offer a zero transmission price. It knows that
it has no chance to gain anything. The market outcomes show
that each generator produces  MW, and receives its bid price.
In fact, by comparing Figures 4 and b, it can be noted that
the nodal price behaviors follow the generator bid behaviors
exactly.
Any price lower than 6('
ﬀ $/MW implies a lower payoff
for $%,&0'

than the one obtained by bidding the price cap.
During the stage when $%,&('

offers the price cap, it is possible
to observe a spike in the production of both generators. It





. After this stage, both the 9;: and $%,&('

raise their
offers. Several cycles of undercut strategy can be observed in
the aftermath. Each of them includes D stages. It can be noted
that in the whole process no equilibrium point is reached.
D. Market participant rewards (2 generators)
In Table I the rewards of the active market agents are shown.
The reward of the  : is also reported. This last quantity is
calculated according to expression (12).
When the capacity of the line is limited, the transmission
owner is able to gain a small amount of money. A limited





and the two loads benefit from a larger transfer capacity.
V. FIVE GENERATORS IN THE SYSTEM
A. Description of the system
The system we consider now is composed of 5 generators.
Two machines are connected to node
 
and three machines
to node  ( &6&37 , &* 3.6 ). The machines at bus   have a
lower marginal cost than the machines at bus  .
The characteristics of the generators are reported in Table
II.
While in the previous section, one machine could generate,
when the capacity of the line was enough, the energy for all








	8  	 9 
	  
Marginal Cost ([$/MW]) 2 2 3 3 3.5
Max. Capacity ([MW]) 40 45 15 15 35
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GENERATORS.
8
$/MW






















Fig. 6. Input of the market : the bids of the five generators and the ; <
the machines located on one side could not generate all the
power for the system.
Two cases are studied in the following. Each one refers to
this system with a different transmission capacity.
B. Market dynamics: Transmission capacity of  MW
A transmission capacity of  MW is considered hereafter.
In Figure 6 the competitors’ bidding behavior is shown. In
Figures 7a-b the production quantities and the nodal prices are
reported.
It can also be noted that in this case no equilibrium is
reached during the whole period. Furthermore, without taking
into account a short initial transient (first stage), a cyclic
behavior can be observed for the bid strategies and therefore
also for the market output. Each cycle goes on for
ﬀ
stages.
By observing Figure 6, it can be noted that at node
 
, during





between marginal costs  $/MW and 64'  $/MW. At the same
time the 9 : bids are 4'
 $/MW and  ' D $/MW, respectively.














equal to 6('  $/MW when < =?> are equal to  ' D $/MW. At
node  , $%,&	

bids a price equal to the price cap ( ﬀ $/MW)
or equal to its marginal cost ( 6('  $/MW), depending on what
it believes about the 9;: and about $%,&03













is lower than the $%,&

marginal cost, it bids its marginal cost, whereas if the sum is





always offer their marginal cost, because they
rely on the $%,&	

bid to determine the nodal price at their bus.
These strategic bid behaviors lead to a maximum energy
bid price at bus
 
of one of these three values:  , 6('  or 6(' 






are equal to the generators’
marginal costs (  $/MW), the transmission bid is also low.
Therefore, the generators at bus
 












&* ), as we can observe














bid price becomes to be so high that a dispatch with a flow
from bus  to bus
 
is not convenient. In such a case, the
sum of the dispatched quantity for the generators at bus
 
is equal to  MW, the power consumed at node A. The 9 
MW





































(a) Production of the five generators (b) Prices at node A and node B


























Fig. 8. Input of the market : the bids of the 5 generators and the ;=<
behavior corresponds to the energy bid price at that bus at each


















based on the comparison of two terms: (i) the sum of the
energy bid price at bus
 
and the transmission price and (ii)
the bid price of $%,&	

. These terms are alternately greater than
the other. Therefore, the dispatched quantities swing for each
generator between a minimum and a maximum value (Fig. 7a).
The 9? behavior always corresponds to the maximum energy
bid price at bus  , among the accepted bids. It oscillates
between the marginal costs 6 and 6('  $/MW (Fig. 7b).
It is interesting to notice, from the comparison between
the values of 9? and 9  , that the highest nodal price is
experienced at bus
 
, where the production cost is lower.
However, by comparing the average values of the two prices,
it is clear that the higher mean value is experienced at bus  .
C. Market dynamics: Transmission capacity of  MW
In the following, we consider a line transfer capacity of
 MW. The system considered is the same here as in the
previous example, and is composed of five generators.
As in the previous case, no equilibrium point is reached.
Except for the initial transient (3 stages), a cyclic behavior
for all the bid prices can be observed (Figure 8). This type of
strategic bids leads to an analogous cyclic behavior both for
the production quantities and for the nodal prices, as shown
in Figures 9a-b.
In this case, the strategic behavior of the active market
participant is further complicated by the presence of the
limited transmission capacity.
While the bid strategies of the generators at bus
 
and the
9;: are very similar to those in the previous case (  3 
MW), the strategy of the generators at bus  is substantially
different. In fact, we can observe that the competition among











































Production of the 5 generators (b) Prices at node A and node B
Fig. 9. Output of the market : production of each generator and nodal prices
Rewards obtained by the different agents






















25 501.2 563.8 111 111 108 12.5 362.5 -3,565 -4,405
50 550.1 569.9 97.5 97.5 0 63 357 -3,620 -4,075
TABLE III
INFLUENCE OF THE LINE TRANSFER CAPACITY ON THE REWARDS.
D. Market participant rewards (5 generators)
The market participant rewards for the two cases previously
analyzed are reported in Table III.
It interesting to notice that all the generators experience
a variation in their payoffs with an increase in line transfer




) benefit from this







). However, the total amount of money
paid by the loads is less in the case of higher transmission
capacity. The money collected by the ISO decreases slightly
when the maximum transmission capacity changes from 
MW to  MW. The 9;: , on the other hand, experiences a
significant increase in its sum of rewards when the line transfer
capacity increases.
VI. MARKET TYPE AND REWARDS
We have analyzed in these last two last sections the dif-
ferent rewards that the agents obtain in a market structure
which allows the transmission owner to be an active market
participant. In reference [5], the same study has been done for
another type of market structure, namely a market working
with the usual locational marginal price and without an active
transmission owner. We propose now to compare the different
rewards obtained by the actors for these two types of markets.
In order to facilitate the comparison, all the relevant results
have been gathered in Tables IV and V.
We can see by observing these two tables that the mar-

















25 2,182.5 715 / 132.5 -4,465 -4,640
50 2,250 0 / 0 -3,625 -3,625
Active transmission owner
25 2,172 885 22.5 40 -4,585 -4,710
50 1,980 205 0 0 -3,865 -3,870
TABLE IV




















25 633 712 68 68 0 / 300 -3410 -4010
50 1000 1125 0 0 0 / 0 -3750 -3750
Active transmission owner
25 501.2 563.8 111 111 108 12.5 362.5 -3,565 -4,405
50 550.1 569.9 97.5 97.5 0 63 357 -3,620 -4,075
TABLE V
REWARDS AND MARKET TYPE. THE FIVE MACHINE POWER SYSTEM.
It may be surprising to note that machines located on
the left side always earn less when dealing with an “Active
transmission owner” market type. These machines have lower
marginal costs than machines located on the right side. And
although in the “Locational marginal price” market they could
bid strategically against the other machines to make more
money, it is slightly different here. They enter in competition
with this new actor, which decreases the amount of money
they can make exporting power to the right side.
Another interesting remark suggested by the analysis of
these two tables is that the idea of an active transmission owner
tends to favor the agents responsible for the transmission
(the couple TO-ISO). Notice that with the market structure
introduced in this paper, the two actors can make money even
when no congestion occurs. Note also that if the couple TO-
ISO earns more in this market structure, the load seems to be
penalized.
Although this analysis is certainly not sufficient to be able
to conclude which market structure could be more efficient in
terms of competitiveness, it shows however that the approach
we have adopted to evaluate the different payoffs of the agents
may be used to design some market rules.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered in this paper a new type of market in
which the transmission owners offer at each market stage a
bid for their services. To study this type of market, we have
modelled the behavior of the different agents of the system
and created a market dynamics. By integrating this market
dynamics over a certain temporal horizon we have been able to
get some insights into the complex phenomena that may occur
in this electricity market, to assess the payoffs of the different
agents (loads, power producers, transmission owners, ISO) of
the system and to determine the influence of the available
transmission capacities on these payoffs. Since the approach
we have used to model the agents’ behavior can be used with
other market types, we have also been able to illustrate how
the different agent payoffs are influenced by the market rules.
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